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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
VALLEY INVEST'ME·NT 'CO., a cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LOS ANGELES & SALT LAKE RAIL-· 
RO·AD COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7300 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
This action was filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court at Salt Lake City, Utah by the plaintiff, a Utah cor-
poration, who sought therein to quiet its title to the prop-
erty described in the complaint. The case was tried before 
the Honorable Roald A. Hogenson, sitting without a jury, 
and after trial rather lengthy briefs were filed. After due 
consideration thereon, Judge Hogenson decided the case 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff and 
signed findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein it 
was determined that the plaintiff's right to quiet title to 
such property was barred by the statute of limitations, spe-
cifically the four year limitation statute applicable to de-
fective tax titles as set forth in Chapters 19 and 20, Laws of 
Utah, 19~43. 
STATEME·NT OF FAC'TS 
Most of the facts in the case were stipulated, but in 
addition to the stipulation certain recitals in deeds and 
certain other documents were introduced in evidence, and 
some little testimony was given with respect to the nature 
of the property and facts pertaining to possession or occu-
pancy of_ the property. 
The property involved was owned by one Oscar F. 
Hunter from 189~4 to 1928. In 1928 the said Oscar 'F. Hunter 
executed a deed wherein he conveyed the property to his 
nine children-or- to eight children, the interest of the ninth 
going to three children of a deceased child. In that deed to 
the nine children it was recited that the conveyance was 
"subject to a life estate in Mindwell Chipman Hunter and 
Anna Elizabeth Hindley Hunter and survivor." There is 
nothing shown in the record as to any such life estate hav-
ing been conveyed to these two women, and they were ap-
parently polygamous wives of Oscar F. Hunter, although 
Mindwell !Chipman Hunter signed as wife in the deed con-
veying the prol?erty to the nine children. Later Mindwell 
Chipman Hunter furnished information for the death cer-
tificate covering the death of Anna Elizabeth Hindley 
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Hunter wherein it was certified that the said Anna Eliza-
beth Hindley Hunter was the wife of Oscar F. Hunter. The 
status of these two wives, or as to which may have been 
considered the lawful wife-whether material or not-was 
not otherwise cleared up by the record. 
In 1931 the nine children who had received the property 
by deed from Oscar F. Hunter in 1928 executed various deeds 
by which they conveyed whatever interest they had in the 
property to Mindwell Chipman Hunter (Tr. 43-44). Under 
date of February 29, 1936, Mindwell C. Hunter gave a bar-
gain and sale deed covering the property to Irene Hunter 
Chamberlain. Under date of November 21, 1937, Irene H. 
Chamberlain McAlpine of Portland, Oregon, execp.ted a 
quitclaim deed to the plaintiff, Valley Investment :Co., a 
Utah corporation. 
The property in question during all of this time was 
vacant, unimproved, alkali property (T~r. 4 7, 58) . There is 
no evidence that any of plaintiff's predecessors held actual 
possession of the property at any time after 1930, and the 
record affirmatively shows that there was no such physical 
occupation of the property by plaintiff or any of its prede-
cessors since March 31, 1936 (Tr. 66). The general prop-
erty taxes for the year 1930 as assessed to the heirs of Oscar 
F. Hunter, as named in the deed of 1928, were not paid, and 
a treasurer's tax sale for nonpayment of such taxes was 
made on December 22, 19'30 (E·xhibit 2.). The taxes for the 
years 1931, 19'3.2, 19'3:3, 1934 and 1935 were also unpaid, 
and there was no redemption of the treasurer's sale for the 
unpaid 1930 taxes, as a result of which an auditor's tax 
deed to Salt Lake ·County covering said property was exe-
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cuted on March 31, 1936 (Exhibit 3). On November 7, 1941, 
pursuant to the provisions of Title 80, Chapter 10, Section 
68, Revised Laws of Utah 1933, as amended by Chapter 101 
of the Session Laws of Utah 1939·, Salt Lake ~County issued 
its deed by which it quitclaimed to the defendant, Los 
Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, the property in-
volved in this action (Exhibit 4). In 1'9-41 defendant built 
spur tracks across this property to serve the Remington 
Arms Plant. 
The taxes as they had been assessed upon this property, 
as shown by Exhibit 2, were in the neighborhood of $15.00 
per year. After 1932 they fell below $15.00 per year. The 
price paid by the defendant for the quitclaim deed, shown 
as the consideration in Exhibit 4, was $172.46. This amount 
would be approximately the equivalent of the six years' 
taxes-1930 to 193.5, inclusive-as shown in Exhibit 2, plus 
a similar average yearly amount for the additional six 
years up to and including 1941. Thus it is apparent that the 
defendant in purchasing said property from the county paid 
to the county an amount to equal taxes which should have 
been paid on the property from and after the year 1930, 
when the plaintiff's predecessors first failed to. pay said 
taxes. Regardless of whether plaintiff will admit that the 
recital in the deed, Exhibit 4, is sufficient to show payment 
of the amount of all of these taxes, the plaintiff neverthe-
less stipulated that the defendant did pay all taxes assessed 
against said property for the years 1942 to 1947, inclusive 
(Tr. 50). 
The defendant has been in possession of the property 
from August, 19,41 to the present time, and neither plain-
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physically occupied said property at any time since March 
31, 19-36 (Tr. 6·6). 
At the time of the treasurer's tax sale for delinquent 
taxes as made on December 22, 1930, the auditor'·s affidav-
its as were required by statute were not attached to the 
assessment roll. This lack of the auditor's affidavits con-
stitutes the only defect in the whole procedure. At least 
no other defects were shown by the record, and except that 
such defects be shown, the auditor's deed and tax sale them-
selves are prima facie proof that all necessary proceedings 
were taken (Section 80-10-68 (7), Utah ·Code Annotated 
1943). 
ARGU'M:ENT 
ARGUMENT N·O. 1 
THE :COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS REFUSAL TO 
SIGN AND FILE PLAINTIF'F'S PRO,POSED FINDiNGS. 
Plaintiff and appellant assigned 27 errors. However, 
in his argument counsel for appellant did not address him-
self specifically to any particular assigned error but grouped 
them together, and the purport of the majority of the errors 
as assigned by appellant merely states in effect that the 
court should have decided for the plaintiff and against the 
defendant and shoula have signed the findings, conclusions 
and judgment as presented by plaintiff rather than those 
granting judgment in .favor of defendant. 
In addressing himself to such an argument under his 
Argument No. 1, counsel accuses the court of being "very 
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careless in the terminology" used in the findings and con-
clusions as signed, and throughout his Argument No. 1 as 
well as his Arguments Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, counsel tries to 
quibble over the use of words and expressions, both as used 
in the findings as signed by the court and as used in the stat-
utes under consideration in this case. He criticizes the use of 
the expression "conveyed or purported to convey," as well 
as the use in the findings of the expression "struck off and 
sold." It is the opinion of counsel for the respondent that 
in all matters such as involved in this case we must look 
to substance rather than to mere form, and quibbling over 
the use of words will not assist us much in getting down 
to the real meaning of what a court intends in a judgment, 
nor of what the legislature may have intended in the enact-
ment of a statute. 
Counsel seems to agree with the statement in the find-
ings, as appears in paragraph 9 as signed by the court, that 
on November 7, 1941, Salt Lake· County executed and de-
livered a deed by which it "conveyed or purported to convey" 
the property to the defendant. The position of the defen-
dant with respect to the use I of such words is that it is im-
material whether or not the conveyance to Irene Hunter 
Chamberlain or to the plaintiff actually conveyed a good 
title, because regardless of whether such title may have 
been good as far as the actual documentary procedure is 
concerned, the grantee might still b~ barred by reason of 
limitations. The question as to whether or not the deed to 
the defendant by which the county conveyed or purported to 
convey the property amounted to a good conveyance might 
be immaterial if the facts are such that even assuming the 
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tax deed to be invalid, yet a purported conveyance would give 
sufficient color of title upon which adverse possession could 
be predicated, which might ripen into a good defense as 
against the plaintiff. Therefore, quibbling over the words 
"conveyed or purported to convey" does not get us any-
where and does not assist the court. 
In paragraph (b) of his Argument 1 on page 19', coun-
sel argues that the treasurer's sale was void for lack of 
proper auditor's affidavits, and he states that thus only a 
purported sale took place. There was an actual treasurer's 
sale which took place. Whether or not it was void because of 
some defect in the procedure does not say that there was 
no treasurer's sale and does not say that the property was 
not sold for unpaid taxes assessed in 1930. There was a treas-
urer's sale and the property was sold1 but because of some 
defect we may admit that the treasurer's sale was void. 
The same is true with respect to his argument under 
paragraph (d) where he says that the finding that the 
defendant purchased the property from the county is not 
true. We dispute counsel's statement. The defendant did 
purchase the property from the county. The fact that be-
cause of some defect in procedure the purchase may be de-
clared void does not enable plaintiff to say that the defen-
dant did not purchase and pay for said property. 
In paragraph (e) on page 21 counsel states that the 
evidence does not show that defendant negotiated for the 
property in the summer of t~941. Perhaps there is not direct 
evidence to that effect, but it is inferentially shown because 
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the testimony does show that the defendant went onto the 
property and built the trackage on it during August of 1941, 
and no deed was issued to the property until November 7, 
194'1 (Tr. 57). The fact that a deed was subsequently issued 
by the county would at least allow the inference that when 
the defendant went onto the property and built its trackage 
there in August of 1941, there must have been some contact 
with the county prior to going onto the property. Whether 
that be a fact or not, however, is immaterial and would not 
constitute such error as would necessitate reversal or even 
serious consideration by this court. 
In paragraph (c) of Argument 1, beginning at page 
19, counsel criticizes the use by the court of the term "struck 
off and sold" to the county. We will refer to this particular 
phase of the matter in a later subdivision of this argument, 
but here again we think that we must look to the substance 
rather than to the mere form and look to what procedure is 
required and what is meant, if anything, by the words 
"struck off and sold" that may be different as far as pro-
cedure is concerned from what -was actually done. Counsel 
states that the 1939 legislature completely revised the pro-
cedure to foreclose a tax lien and that ·Chapter 101, Laws 
of Utah 1939, referred to in the trial court's findings, re-
pealed the provisions relating to the execution of the audi-
tor's tax deed. We must dispute counsel's statement. The 
provisions relating to auditor's tax d_eeds were not repealed. 
Section 2 of Chapter 101, Laws of 19·39, specifies the sec-
tions which were repealed and these were sections relating 
to the treasurer's affidavit. The provisions relating to 
auditor's tax deeds were not repealed. We will admit that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
the 1939 legislature did reframe some of the wording of 
the statute and rearrange some of the sections as regards 
material contained therein, but the fundamental procedure 
was not substantially changed. 
Counsel refers 'to the fact that 'the last nineteen lines 
of Section 80-10-66, which provide for the auditor's tax 
deed, were deleted in the amended enactment of said sec-
tion. They were deleted from Section 6.6 but "Section 80-
10-68 was enacted in its stead," as stated by counsel, and 
most of what was contained in those nineteen lines in Sec-
tion 66 was carried over into Section 68 as amended. (See 
subparagraphs ( 5) and ( 6) of Section 68 as contained in . 
Utah 'Code Annotated 1943.) The fact that provisions for-
merly contained in one section may upon amendment be 
differently combined in other sections does not necessarily 
say that they are changed so that their effect is not the 
same. If counsel will read the provisions of Section 80-10-
68 and compare them with the provisions of the nineteen 
lines which he refers to as being deleted from Section 80-
10-66, he will find that he is in error in his statement that 
"not one clause of those nineteen deleted lines mentioned 
above was incorporated into 80-10-68, or any subdivision 
therein contained." 
ARGUMENT NO. 2 
TAX TITLE IS DEFECTIVE. 
At the outset defendant will admit that by reason of 
the failure of the auditor's affidavits to be attached to the 
assessment rolls at the time of the tax sale, defendant's tax 
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title is defective, and at this juncture we wish to point out 
that that is the very reason we are here seeking to apply 
the provisions of the statute of limitations as contained in 
Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as 
Section 104-2~5.10, Utah ·Code Annotated 1943. If the tax 
proceedings as had upon this property were not defective, 
then the defendant would not be attempting to rely upon 
any limitation statute. If the tax title was not defective, 
there would be no reason for any attempt to apply the pro-
visions of Section-104-2-5.10 as contained in the 1943! stat-
utes. In fact, if there were no defects in the tax title pro-
cedure there would be no necessity whatsoever for the pro-
visions as enacted by the legislature and contained in said 
Section 104-2-5.10. The fact that proper procedure had 
not been strictly followed in connection with this treasurer's 
sale for taxes compels the conclusion that the defendant 
did not get a good indefeasible title from the county in its 
deed of November 7, 1941. That does not mean, however, 
that the defendant cannot claim some rights by virtue of 
said deed from Salt Lake County upon which it can base a 
possession which will be adverse to the plaintiff and which, 
if sufficient time has elapsed, will form an adequate basis 
by which defendant can bar plaintiff's right to recover the 
property solely upon the basis of adverse possession and 
payment of taxes. 
The plaintiff cites the case of Anson v. Ellison, 140 P. 
2d 65·3-, and states that defendant has no basis to assert 
a lien for taxes by virtue of its purchase of the tax title or 
for taxes paid to the county. Defendant is not attempting 
to claim or assert any lien for such taxes, but defendant will 
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not agree with plaintiff's theory that defendant received 
absolutely nothing. The defendant did receive a deed from 
the county which gave the defendant sufficient color of title 
upon which it could base an adverse possession, and with 
that color of title the defendant went into possession and 
held the possession for sufficient length of time to bar 
plaintiff's rights if Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, is ap-
plicable to the situation involved herein. 
In order to save some argument with plaintiff, we 
again repeat that if the tax procedure had been properly 
followed and if the tax title were good, defendant then 
would have based its defen~e upon that tax title and upon 
valid procedure having been taken. The fact that the tax 
procedure was not strictly followed and that therefore the 
tax title was defective puts defendant in the position where 
it must prevail, if at all, upon adverse possession under 
the four-year statute. This court has held that a deed from 
the county, such as was issued to the defendant in this case, 
even though the same be defective, is sufficient to form a 
basis for adverse possession from which, if the proper time 
has run with the payment of taxes, the one who has held 
that possession and paid such taxes can set them up as a 
bar against a plaintiff even though the plaintiff may other-
wise have a good record title to the property. See W elner 
v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490. 
If in the Anson case, as cited by plaintifft the plain-
tiff had secured the same tax title-which was admittedly 
invalid-and thereunder had held possesion and paid taxes 
for seven years, plaintiff here would not seriously contend 
under such circumstances that a good title had not been 
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acquired by such adverse possession. Just so in the case 
at bar. Even though defendant may have acquired its title 
and possession under a defective tax title, a definite pro-
vision of our statute of limitations says that if the former 
owner should seek to a vail himself of his record title and 
attempt to recover the property he m~st do so within four 
years, and under such circumstances if he does not do so 
within four years he is as effectively barred as he would 
be under the provisions of the statute where an adverse 
possessor not relying on a tax title has nevertheless held 
possession for seven years and paid taxes. At the time of 
the Anson case an invalid tax title gave nothing except a 
basis upon which one who took possession and paid taxes 
for seven years thereafter could perfect a defense against 
one seeking to assert a record title. Since that time, how-
ever, with the enactment of the 1943 statute, the legisla-
ture provided in effect that although seven years are nec-
essary in ordinary adverse possession cases, if the adverse 
possession is based upon a defective tax title, then if the 
prior record owner wants to avail himself of his good rec-
ord title he must do so within four years or be barred. 
ARGUMENTS NO. 4 AND NO. 5 
SE:CTTON 104-2-5.10 AS AMEND·E.D AND SET 
FORTH B·Y ·CHAPT1ER 19, LAWS OF UTAH 19·43, IS 
APPL]CABLE AND- IS A VERY DEFINITE AND EF-
FECTIVE B~AR TO PLAINTIFF'S A·CTIO'N HEREIN .. 
SE1CTION 104-2-5.10 AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
8, LAWS OF UTAH 1947, DiOES NOT APPLY AS A BAR 
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TO PLAINTIFF'S .A!CTION BUT IS MERELY A 1C·LARI-
FICATION OF CHAPTER 19, LAWS OF UT'AH 1943, 
SHOWIN·G THAT SAID CHAPTER 19 DOES APPLY TO 
THE CASE AT BAR. 
Defendant is going to change the order of the argu-
ment here and argue with respect to plaintiff's point No. 
4 ahead of plaintiff's point No. 3, and defendant will com-
bine plaintiff's Arguments Nos. 4 and 5 under this one 
heading. 
In his argument counsel for appellant gives his own 
manufactured designations to various statutory provisions 
and refers to different sections as "Auditor's ·Tiax Deed 
Statute," "Struck Off and Sold Statute," and "Struck Off 
and Sold Limitation Statute." Appellant attacks the find-
ing of the court that the substance of the provisions of Sec-
tion 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, were trans-
ferred to and embodied in Section 80-10-68. Under the pro-
visions of Section 80-10-66 as it existed before the 1939· 
amendment it was provided : 
"If any property sold to the county and not as-
signed is not redeemed within the time and in the 
manner aforesaid, the county recorder shall immed-
iately, upon the expiration of the period of redemp-
tion, file the tax-sale record for the year of original 
sale with the county auditor, who shall as soon as 
may be thereafter make out a deed conveying to the 
county all such property, and cause the same to be 
recorded in the name of the county." (Italics ours.) 
This provision, according to the wording as therein 
contained, was not taken verbatim over into the 1'9'3'9 amend-
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ment, and therefore plaintiff's counsel says that we no longer 
have an Auditor's Tax Deed Statute. The effect of Section 
80-10-68 as amended in 1939 and as carried into the Utah 
Code Annotated-1943, while not using the same terminology, 
accomplishes the same purpose. Subparagraph (5) of Sec-
tion 80-10-68 in the 1943 statute provides that deeds issued 
by the county auditor must recite the amount of taxes, pen-
alties, etc., as contained in the latter portion of Section 66 · 
as it existed prior to the 1939 amendment, and paragraph 
( 5) of Section 68 goes on to provide the form of tax deed 
to be issued by the county to a purchaser at the May sale. 
Subparagraph (6) of Section 68 then provides: 
"Any property offered for sale as aforesaid and 
for which there is no purchaser shall be struck off 
to the county by the county auditor, who shall pub-
licly declare substantially as follows: 'All property 
here offered for sale and which has not been struck 
off to a private purchaser is hereby struck off and 
sold to the county of _____ ._________________________________ (naming 
the county), and I hereby declare the fee simple title 
of said property to be vested in said county.' The 
county auditor shall thereupon make an endorsement 
opposite each of the entries in the tax sale record 
showing the preliminary sale of said property for 
delinquent taxes, substantially as follows: 'The fee 
simple title to the property described in this entry 
was on the _____________________ . _____________ day of May, 19· __________ , , · 
sold and conveyed to the county of ___________________________ _ 
in payment of general taxes charged against the 
same,' and shall sign his riame thereto. The fee sim-
ple title to said property shall thereupon vest in the 
county. The auditor shall then deposit said tax sale 
record with the county recorder and the book shall 
thereupon become a part of the official records of 
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the recorder and shall be deemed to have been re-
corded by him. * * *" 
Thus the auditor, by endorsement upon the tax sale 
record, states and certifies over his signature that the prop-
erty in question was sold and conveyed to the county, and 
the record is then filed with the county recorder and the 
title thereupon vests in the county. The certification by the 
auditor is that the property was "sold and conveyed to the 
county." The effect is the same as formerly when the audi-
tor made a formal auditor's deed conveying the property 
to the county, and merely simplified the procedure by hav-
ing the auditor endorse the fact of such conveyance upon 
the tax sale record rather than making a separate deed for 
the same, and then filing the tax sale record with the county 
recorder as a record of the title's having been sold and con-
veyed to the county. This distinction in wording and in 
effecting the conveyance to the county by endorsement on 
the tax sale record rather than by a separate deed is a dis-
tinction and a difference in form but not in substance, and 
the effect is the same as it was prior to the 193·9 statute, 
which is that there is a preliminary sale by the treasurer, 
then a May sale, and if property is not purchased by 
some outside individual, the auditor conveys the property 
to the county. 
We insist that the trial court was justified in saying 
that the substance of the provisions of 80-10-66- were em-
bodied in Section 80-10-68 as amended by the 1'9·3.9· Laws. 
Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, provides: 
"No action for the recovery of real property 
struck off and sold to the county, as provided by sec-
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tion 80-10-6-8 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943~, or for 
the possession thereof shall be maintained and no 
defense or counter-claim to any action involving the 
recovery of property, or the defense of title to prop-
erty, sold at such tax sale, or public or private sale, 
or for possession thereof, shall be set up or main-
tained, unless the same be brought or set up within 
four years from date on which the sale was held. 
* * *" 
There was a reason why the legislature enacted ~Chapter 
19, Laws qf Utah .1943, and it is a well-known principle of 
statutory construction that we must assume that the legis-
lature did not do a useless thing and the statute must be 
upheld as being valid if possible. The basis of the statute 
and the reason for its enactment was not sales that had been 
made pursuant to Section 80-10-68 (6), after the amendment 
of 1939. The basis and reason for the statute arose long 
before that time. 
There was a justifiable reason for limiting the period 
of adverse possession with respect to property purchased on 
tax sales to four years, or some other similar period short 
of the usual seven years required in the regular adverse 
possession statute. Such shorter period enabled a person 
who had bought property from the county after tax sales 
which might be questioned to have the assurance that if the 
tax title was going to be attacked the prior owner of the 
property would have to do so within the four years and he 
would thereby not have to wait too long to know whether 
his title could be confirmed or whether he might have to 
suffer having the property taken a~ay from him. 
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At the time of the enactment of Chapter 19, Laws of 
Utah 19'43, the 1939 amendment was contained in the 19,43 
Code as it had been compiled, and Section 80-10-68 ( 6) con-
tained the substance of the provisions which represented, 
if they did not embody verbatim, the provisions which had 
theretofore existed in the statutes with respect to tax sales · 
and the conveyance of property by t_he auditor to the county 
where such tax sales had not been redeemed. It is true 
that ·Chapter 19 refers by specific terms to real property 
struck off and sold to the county, "as provided by section 
80-10-68 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943." In construing 
what was meant by t_he legislature in enacting this statute 
we must consider the reason for the statute and the history 
back of it. Counsel argues that this statute refers only to 
property which he says was "struck off and sold to the 
county" under the provisions of the "Struck Off and Sold 
Statute," but could not within reason be considered to in-
clude property "conveyed to the county under the Auditor's 
Tax Deed Statute." He argues that this property was never 
struck off and sold to the county. W-e disagree. It was 
sold to the county on the tax sale and it was conveyed to 
the county by the auditor's tax deed as effectively and to 
all intents and purposes the _same as if the auditor had 
endorsed his conveyance upon the tax sale record. 
:Counsel argues that the statute does not apply to the 
case in question because inasmuch as the tax proceedings 
were defective nothing was conveyed to the county. Coun-
sel in effect states that if the tax sales and the auditor's 
deed or conveyance to the county all defective, then the 
property _is not sold to the county, and where they are thus 
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defective and property not sold to the county Chapter 19 
does not apply. If all tax proceedings were proper and 
valid and the sale to the county a legal sale, we repeat as 
hereinabove statedv there would be no purpose whatsoever 
in the enactment of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943. The 
only possible necessity and the only reason for the enact-
ment of such a statute is to give a basis for confirmation 
of tax titles after a lapse of a short period of time in such 
instances where the tax sales and the conveyances to the 
county are for some reason defective and invalid and sub-
ject to being set aside. 
Plaintiff's attitude in his brief is the same a~ it was 
in the trial court, that there is ambiguity in the statute, 
and respondent will agree with him to the extent that there 
must be some interpretation by this court and some con-
struction placed upon the statute to find just what was in-
tended by the legislature. The history back of tax titles 
within this state, particularly during the 1930's and the 
cases decided by this court leave no question at all as to 
the reason for the enactment of this statute. 
·Counsel for appellant did not see fit to refer to very 
much by way· of authority, but respondent would. like to 
refer to some cases and authorities that may give some 
assistance in construing the intent of the legislature in 
enacting the statute in question. 
IN·TENT O·F LEGIS.LATURE AND B.A!CKGR·OUND 
O·F ·C~IR~CUMST·ANICES FOR'MING BASIS OF AND 
NE·CESSITY FOR CH'APTER 19, LAWS OF u·TAH 1943. 
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In 50 American Jurisprudence, Section 305, page 291, 
it is stated: 
"Mischief to Be Prevented or Remedied.-In the 
construction of an ambiguous statute it is proper to 
take into consideration the particular evils at which 
the legislation is aimed or the mischief sought to be 
avoided-that is, to the occasion and necessity for 
the law, or causes which induced its enactment, as 
well as the remedy intended to be afforded and the 
result sought to be attained, or the benefits expected 
to be derived, where these matters can be legitimately 
ascertained. Where possible, the statute should be 
given such a construction as, when practically ap-
plied, will tend to suppress the evil which the legis-
lature intended to prohibit. Under these rules, a case 
which is within the mischief of a statute has been 
regarded as within its provisions, and the tendency 
has been to so interpret the statute as to embrace all 
situations in which the mischief sought to be reme-
died is found to exist." (Italics ours.) 
In considering the background and reasons for the 
enactment of the statute as contained in Chapter 19, L,aws 
of Utah 1943, we find the following: During the period of 
1930 up to the time of this statute, 1943,, and particularly 
the period during the depression days, a lot of property 
had gone to tax sale and to tax deed in all of the counties 
within the State of Utah, but in many if not most instances 
proper steps had not been taken by the various counties, 
even under the statutory provisions then existing, so as to. 
enable the counties to acquire good titles to these tax prop-
erties. This court held that in some instances the title of 
the county was not good because the auditor's affidavits 
had not been attached, as in the case at bar. In other in-
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stances advertising of the May sale had not been published 
for the full length of time determined necessary. Because 
of these and other defects the counties could not dispose 
of such properties to advantage because it became a matter 
of common knowledge that a tax title could be upset. Yet 
in spite of this a lot of the properties had been sold to the 
county, auditor's deeds had been issued to the county, the 
property had been conveyed or struck off to the county, and 
such properties had stood in the name of the county on the 
county records so that further tax revenue could not be 
received therefrom, and people, standing in a position for-
merly and now held by plaintiff and its predecessors, stood 
by disregarding their tax obligations to the sovereign tax 
power. 
The case at bar is a good and flagrant example of the 
very thing that happened in numerous instances. 'The orig-
inal tax sale was made in 1930 and although neither plain-
tiff nor any of its predecessors has made any move to pay 
such taxes to the county or redeem the property from the 
county, it is still trying to recover the property because 
there has been some increase in its value because of an in-
flation that has existed over the country, and now seeks 
to defeat the statute and recover the property in spite of 
the fact that nineteen years have elapsed without any pre-
tense on its part of recognizing the sovereign tax power 
or attempting to pay or redeem the property from any of 
the taxes assessed. 
As was said by the court in the case of Towson v. Den-
son, 86 S. W. 661 : 
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"The right of the state to have its taxes prompt-
ly paid is as important as the right of the individual 
to be protected in his property. T'axes are the price 
paid for such protection. Those only who have color 
of title obtain rights of possession under the act. 
And he who claims to be the real owner can prevent 
this by himself paying taxes or taking actual pos-
session of a~d improving the lands." 
Under conditions as they existed in the State of Utah 
prior to 1943 people in a position such as plaintiff and its 
predecessors felt that they could rely on recovering their 
properties at any time they so chose even though the prop-
erties had gone to tax sale and been conveyed or struck off 
to the county. They felt there was no necessity of going into 
possession of their lands and paying their taxes to the 
county, and even felt there was not much need for worry 
if someone else purchased these lands from the county and 
improved them. All they were concerned about was that 
if someone else purchased and improved and paid taxes on 
the property, they could step in just shortly before the 
seven-year period of adverse possession had run and they 
could then reclaim and take possession of the property. It 
is for this very reason that the statute. as contained in ~chap­
ter 19,· Laws of Utah 1943", was passed-to stabilize these 
tax titles and to give both the county and the purchaser 
something they could rely on. The upholding of such a law 
would enable the county to dispose of such properties and 
to recover some of the tax monies due it, as has been done 
in the case at bar. The defendant paid all of the taxes that 
were assessed or would have been assessed during the time 
the county held the property as a part of the purchase price 
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and has paid all taxes since. The statute gave a basis of 
assurance to a purchaser, who paid these. tax monies to the 
county, that if his title in the property was not 'good the 
former owner would have to attack it within four years, 
and if not attacked within four years, such purchaser could 
rest secure in the knowledge that his title and possession 
could not thereafter be disturbed. 
If this was not the purpose and effect of Chapter 19, 
Laws of Utah 1943, then it had no purpose and was without 
effect whatsoever. The law does not do a useless thing and 
does not consider that the State Legislature would pass a 
useless act. 
There is a justifiable reason for making a separate pro-
vision in the limitations statutes with respect to such tax 
titles and the majority of states have at one time or another 
made such separate provision for such tax titles. The State 
of Oklahoma in 1919 passed a statute confirming such tax 
titles after six months. This was amended in 192·3 extend-
ing the period to twelve months, but provided that a prior 
owner, if he sought to· avoid or set aside a tax deed which 
had been purchased on resale from the county, must do so 
within twelve months. In discussing the question and the 
reason for the statute the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in 
Swan v. Kuehner, 10 P. 2d 7·07, stated : 
"* * * 'It had become proverbial that a tax 
title was no title at all, and a sale for taxes was as 
near mockery as any proceeding having the appear-
ance of legal sanction could be. The principal cause 
was the difficulty in proving the various steps es-
sential to the validity of such a sale.' * * * and 
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that it was necessary that some additional induce-
ment be offered to the purchase of land offered for 
sale at a tax resale. 
"* * * The 1923 act shows a clear legisla-
tive intent to limit the time during which a former 
owner of real estate may commence an actio~ to avoid 
or set aside a resale tax deed to one year. * * * 
"The 1923 act (section 6) provides that'* * * 
such notice and return shall be presumptive evidence 
of the regularity, legality and validity of all the of-
ficial acts leading up to such resale.' That presump-
tion may be rebutted by the former owner or owners 
of the land in an action to avoid or set aside the deed 
commenced within one year after the recording of 
the deed; but at the expiration of one year the pre..; 
sumption becomes conclusive. The former owner has 
a right, for one year after the date of the recording 
of the resale tax deed, to commence an action for the 
purpose of rebutting the presumption created by the 
legislative authority. The length of time is reason-
able. The legislative power to provide for the issu-
ance of a tax deed is the legislative power to provide 
a limited period in which the presumptions arising 
from the execution, acknowledgment, delivery, and 
recording of a resale tax deed may be rebutted, and 
the legislative power to provide that after the expi-
ration of that period the presumptions may not be 
rebutted. * * * 'It is immaterial whether the 
sale and the deed be void or valid. It is sufficient. 
that a sale has been made, and the deed recorded, to 
bring the statute into activity, and, after the lapse 
of the period limited, to entitle the purchaser, and 
those claiming under him, to its protection.' * * *" 
(Italics ours.) 
It will be noted that the Oklahoma statute sets up presump-
tions as to the validity of the tax proceedings, just as the 
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Utah statute does. (See Section 80-10-68 (7), Utah 1Code 
Annotated 1943) . 
In that Oklahoma case the trial court held for the plain-
tiff but the Supreme :Court said the one year limitation sta~ 
ute applied and reversed the trial court, saying : 
"* * * The action of the plaintiff was not 
commenced within the period prescribed by the ap-
plicable statute of limitations for the commencement 
of such an action. The trial court should have so 
held and should have denied the plaintiff the relief 
sought." 
A similar statute in the State of Montana was involved 
in the case of Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Worranty Title 
Co., 134 P. 302. In that case the defendant did not season-
ably enter the plea of the statute of limitations and the 
Supreme ~Court of Montana, while holding that if the plea 
had been seasonably interposed it would have been a suf-
ficient defense, nevertheless held that being a plea of stat- . 
ute of limitations it was a matter which could be waived 
and if not waived, must be asserted, and that under the cir-
cumstances in that case the defendant had delayed so long 
in interposing the plea of the statute that the trial court 
was considered as not having abused his discretion in re-
fusing to allow an amendment to set up the plea. It is inter-
esting to note that in the Montana case there is an argu-
ment similar to the one urged by plaintiff in the trial court 
in this case wherein plaintiff said that it was not seeking 
to recover the property or possession thereof, but merely to 
quiet title to the property and that therefore our 1943 stat-
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ute does not apply. With respect to a similar contention 
the Montana court said : 
"Respondent makes the suggestion that the stat-
ute applies only to actions 'to set aside or annul a tax 
deed'; that this is not such an action, but one to quiet 
title merely, hence the statute does not apply. In 
other words, a plaintiff seeking, in fact, to destroy 
the effect of a tax deed must confront the statute if 
he assail the tax deed as such, but, designing to ac-
complish precisely the same thing, he may avoid the 
statute by calling his action one to quiet title, de-
claring upon his ownership generally and demanding 
that his adversary appear and plead the tax deed. 
This is surely a subordination of substance to form; 
a thing is not changed by changing its name. Where 
the sole object of an action is to get rid of a tax deed 
as a claim of title adverse to the plaintiff, we see no 
reason why it is not as much an action to_ annul or set 
aside such deed as though expressly so designated." 
The court went on to state with respect to the action there 
involved that under the authorities, "* * * that this 
action as it finally exhibits itself in the agreed statement 
of facts is subject to the limitational provisions of the 
statute in question." The court nevertheless upheld the 
trial court in refusing to allow the plea of the statute to be 
invoked at an extremely late date. 
An early case involving such a statute is the case of 
Walker v. Boh, (Kans.) 4 P. 272. In that case it was the 
holder of the tax title who sought to quiet the title as against 
the former owner and that was one of the early cases in-
volving a statute similar to our 1943 statute that confirms 
the wording of our statute as being one that may be used 
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"as a shield but not as a sword." In that case the defect 
was that proper notice of the tax sale had not been pub-
lished, but inasmuch as the holder of the tax title, who was 
out of possession, was the one seeking to invoke the aid of 
the statute, the Kansas court held that the statute did not 
apply in his favor. The statute in that case read: 
"Any suit or proceeding against a tax purchaser, 
his heirs or assigns, for the recovery of land sold for 
taxes, or to defeat or avoid a sale or conveyance of 
land .for taxes, except in cases where the taxes have 
been paid on the land redeemed as provided by law, 
shall be commenced within five years from the time 
of recording the tax deed, and not thereafter." 
The Kansas court in that case said: 
"Now, it may be that this limitation has so run 
in favor of the plaintiff's tax deed that no person 
could maintain an action against him for the recovery 
of the land, or to defeat or avoid his tax deed. But 
this is not such an action. This is not an action 
'against' the plaintiff, but it is an action brought by 
himself and in his own favor; nor is it an action 
brought to recover the land, or to defeat or avoid 
the tax deed, but it is an action simply to quiet title, 
upon the assumption that the tax deed is valid, and 
virtually to bolster up and sustain the tax deed; the 
defendant is simply defendant, and is not asking for 
any affirmative relief. Now, it does not seem that 
this limitation reaches any such case as this. The 
statute seems to be enacted to prevent persons from 
instituting proceedings to defeat or avoid tax deeds 
after the five years have elapsed, but it does not 
seem to be enacted for the purpose of preventing per-
sons from defending· their rights when attacked. M-
ter the five-years limitation has run, the holder of 
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the tax deed may unquestionably retain all that he is 
in the possession of under his tax deed, but he must 
not commence an action to obtain something more 
without being prepared to meet any defense which 
the defendant may set up." 
If the plaintiff were in possession of the property in 
question here and defendant had acquired a tax deed, then 
plaintiff may logically argue that it was merely suing tore-
move a cloud from its title, but the statute in question was 
designed absolutely to protect a purchaser of a tax title 
from the county who had gone into possession of property 
and to prevent the former owner from instituting proceed-
ings on an affirmative basis to recover title or possession 
or to take anything away from the tax deed holder that he 
had acquired by virtue of that tax deed. 
In view of the foregoing we feel that further reference 
to the intent of the legislature in enacting Chapter 19, Laws 
of 1943, would be proper. 
Sutherland on Statutory .Construction, ·Third Edition, 
Volume 2, Section 4506, page 322, has the following to say 
with respect to legislative intent: 
"If legislative intent has meaning for the inter-
pretative process it means not a collection of subjec-
tive wishes, hopes and prejudices of individuals, but 
rather the objective footprints left on the trail of 
legislative enactment. Legislative intent can't be 
'dreamed up'. It can be speculated about; but it can 
be discovered only by facutal inquiry into the history 
of the 'enactment of the statute, the background cir-
cumstances which brought the problem before the 
legislature." 
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The "background circumstances" which brought the 
problem before the legislature were not the titles· based 
upon Section 80-10-68 ( 6), as amended by the 1939· statute, 
but it was the fact that numerous tax titles based upon pro-
cedure prior to 1939 had been declared to be invalid because 
the procedure set up in the statute had not been strictly fol-
lowed, as a result of which a large amount of property had 
gone off the tax rolls, and this was a means of confirming 
titles in individuals who purchased tax titles without wait-
ing the full seven years. 
With respect to interpretation, Sutherland, Volume 2, 
Section 4·505, page 321, also states as follows: 
"* * * But as all future circumstances can-
not be anticipated by even the most farsighted legis-
lator the function of judicial interpretation cannot 
be completely avoided. When such a circumstance 
arises certainly the safest starting point for inter-
pretation will be the statute itself. But it is by no 
means the safest st~pping point. Before the true 
meaning of the statute can be determined considera-
tion must be given to the problem in society to which 
the legislature addressed itself, prior legislative con-
sideration of the problem, the legislative history of 
the statute under litigation, and to the operation and 
administration of the statute prior to litigation." 
(Italics ours.) 
Again we insist it was to perfect tax titles by limitation 
so as to get property back on the tax rolls that formed the 
basis of this 19-43 statute. 
Another means of construction which is used by courts, 
as indicated in the last paragraph just quoted, is that the 
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court must consider "the legislative history of the statute 
under litigation." The s~atute in question was amended in 
1947, and by the 1947 amendment the legislature very clear-
ly pointed out that it intended the statute to cover not only 
the specific section as quoted, being "section 80-10-68 (6) ," 
but also property "conveyed to the county prior to Septem-
ber 1, 1939 by auditor's deed under the provisions of sec-
tion 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933." 
Amendatory acts can be very helpful in explaining 
and construing the ·intent of the legislature at the time it 
I 
enacted the original act. Sutherland on Statutory Construc-
tion, Third Edition, Volume 1, Section 1929, page 410, says: 
"* * * The object in construing an amenda-
tory act is to determine the legislative intent * * * 
The amendment will be given a reasonable construc-
tion; a literal construction which would lead to ab-
surd consequences will be avoided. When the intent 
of the legislature is not clear from its language the 
court will consider surrounding circumstances." 
And again in Section 1931, page 416, the same author-
ity states: 
"Since an amendment changes an existing stat-
ute the general rule of statutory interpretation that 
the surrounding circumstances are to be considered 
is particularly applicable to the interpretation of 
amendatory acts. The original act or section and 
conditions thereunder must be looked at. Judicial or 
executive interpretation of the original act espec-
ially must be considered. The court will determine 
what defects existed in the original act, which de-
fect the legislature intended to cure, and then con-
strue the amendment so as to reduce or eliminate the 
defect intended to be remedied. 
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"If the amendment was enacted soon after con-
troversies arose as to the interpretation of the orig-
inal act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a 
legislative interpretation of the original act-a for-
mal change-!f'ebutting the presumption of substan-
tial change." (Italics ours.) 
Volume 2, Section 5110, page 526, states: 
"Where a former statute is amended, or a doubt-
ful meaning of a former statute rendered certain by 
subsequent legislation a number of courts have held 
that such amendment or recent legislation is strong 
evidence of what the legislature intended by the first 
statute. * * * 
"* * * Where the original law was subject 
to very serious doubt, by permitting subsequent 
amendments to control the former meaning a great 
deal of uncertainty in the law is removed. And the 
legislature is probably in the best position to ascer-
tain the most desirable construction. In addition it 
is just as probable that the legislature intended to 
clear up uncertainties, as it did to change existing 
law where the former law is changed in only minor 
details. In People v. Davenport (91 N.Y. 574) where 
the New York court has established a test that is 
highly satisfactory, it was stated, 'The force which 
should be given to subsequent, as affecting prior leg-
islation, depends largely upon the circumstances un-
der which it takes place. If it follows immediately 
and after controversies upon the use of doubtful 
phraseology therein have arisen as to the true con-
struction of the prior law it is entitled to great 
weight. * * *" (Italics ours.) 
After the enactment of Chapter 19, of the 1943 Laws, 
there were controversies which arose as to whether by men-
tioning Section 80-10-68 ( 6) the legislature intended to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
limit the statute to apply only to tax titles arising after the 
amendment of 1939, or whether the period of limitation as 
contained in Chapter 19 was intended to apply to all tax 
titles in connection with which there may be some defect 
so that by a shorter period of limitation the property might 
be put back on the tax rolls. Because these controversies 
arose and because there was some discussion of it among 
members of the bar, the draftsmen who drafted the original 
1943 statute prepared and submitted the 1947 amendment. 
The 1947 amendment itself, therefore, is strong evidence 
of the intent of the legislature and shows that the legislature 
intended for the 1943 law to cover all void tax titles and 
limit the period during which an action could be brought 
by the former owner to four years. The amendments to 
other sections as contained in chapters 18 and 20 of the 1943 
laws very strongly confirm that this was the intent of the 
legislature. 
A matter simila.r to the one involved in the case at bar 
was before the federal court in the case of United States 
v. Perkins, Secretary of Labor, 17 F. Supp. 17'7. An early 
statute affecting the citizenship of a minor provided that 
where the minor had alien parents, upon naturalization of 
or resumption of American citizenship "by the parent", the 
minor would automatically become an American citizen. In 
construing what was meant by the words "by the parent", 
it was argued very forcibly that a mother was not included 
in the words, the mother's domicile following that of the 
father the father was the one to be considered as the parent 
involved in that action. The act was subsequently amended 
by Congress and in the amended act it was provided that 
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upon "the naturalization of or resumption of American 
citizenship by the father or the mother" a minor would 
automatically become an American citizen. The Federal 
District ·Court in and for the District of ·Columbia in apply-
ing the earlier act held that the subsequent amendment was 
merely a legislative interpretation of what Congress had 
intended by the original act. The· court stated : 
"I think that the amended act was passed not to 
change the former law but to clarify it, by express-
ing more clearly the intent of Congress. It is true 
of course that an act passed for the purpose of clari-
fying a former act does not change the law as it had 
theretofore existed, and could not divest parties of 
rights which had been acquired under the original 
act, * * *" 
Although the prior act was the one which it was argued 
applied to the case, the court concluded: 
"I think that under the law petitioner became 
a naturalized citizen upon the resumption of citizen-
ship by his mother." 
A similar problem came before the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in the case of Rural Independent School District v. 
New Independent School District, 94 N. W. 284. That case 
involved a school township as distinguished from an inde-
pendent school district or distinct school corporation. Orig-
inally the school districts were organized upon a township 
. basis and the general school law referred to a "school town-
ship." The general school law was amended from time to 
time and carried forward the phraseology ''school town-
ship." However, other legislation authorized the creation of 
independent school districts as separate, independent cor-
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porations, formed on a different basis than the original 
school townships. The court in that case observed: 
"* * * In other. words, it seems that when 
rural independent districts were created the general 
language of the school law, as it existed at the time, , 
and was subsequently re-enacted with reference to 
the formation of the territory of cities, towns, or 
villages into independent districts, was not changed 
to correspond. * * *" 
The case arose because of the question of the different 
terminology as used in the seperate statutes, but the court 
went on to say after referring to the changes in the general 
school law: 
"* * * Under these circumstances, we are 
justified in taking into consideration the general leg-
islative purpose, and giving it effect, even though 
we are required thereby to extend or curtail the lan-
guage used in some portions of the statute. The rule 
that a statute cannot be extended by construction so 
as to cover a casus omissus is recognized in the crim-
inal law, but not in the interpretation of remedial 
statutes." (Italics ours.) 
Because of the controversy which arose in the School 
District case the legislature amended the statute while the 
matter was in litigation and with respect thereto the high 
court said: 
"Since the proceedings involved in this case were 
commenced, the Legislature has amended Code, Sec-
tion 2794, so as to make it directly applicable to such 
a case as the one now before us * * * ; and 
counsel for plaintiff contends that this legislative 
recognition of the necessity for an amendment in 
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order to cover such a case is an admission that prev-
iously the statute did not cover the case. We need 
not, however, assume to be so ignorant of the meth-
ods of legislation as to profess not to know that a 
statute may be insufficient in its language to carry 
out the legislative intent, and that when difficulties 
arise in its interpretation the Legislature is likely to 
change the language so as to make its application 
clear in other cases, even ·though the amendment 
could not be effective as to the case in which the dif-
ficulty has arisen. It is quite as likely that the lan-
guage of the amendment was intended to make the 
statute correspond to what had previously been sup-
posed or assumed to be the law as that it was thereby 
intended to change the general intent and purpose of 
the law." (Italics ours.) 
The high court then concluded: 
"Our conclusion is that to carry out the legisla-
tive intent found in Code, Section 2794, reading it in 
the light of the history of the· school legislation and 
contemporaneous provisions of the school law, we 
should consider 'school township,' in that section, as 
'school corporation,' and thus find that, as originally 
enacted in the Code of 1897, its meaning was the 
same as that whick is now expressly declared by act 
of the Twenty-Ninth General Assembly." (Italics 
ours.) 
In the case of School District No. 18 v. Pondera County, 
297 P. 4·98, the Supreme .court of Montana had a similar 
question before it, and the particular statute there in ques-
tion involved the collection and apportionment of taxes be-
tween a county and a school district. Counsel for plaintiff 
and appellant will find the use of the words "struck off" 
somewhat involved in that Montana case, and "sold to the 
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county" is also somewhat involved. In that case the Mon-
tana court in part held: 
"Under the authorities cited, the construction of 
section 2234 asked by the county, strictly according 
to its letter, would condemn the provision as uncon-
stitutional, while under that contended for by the 
school district the act will be valid. If a statute is 
capable of two constructions, one of which will con-
demn it as unconstitutional while the other will pre-
serve it, it is the duty of this court to give to the 
statute that construction which will vitalize it. * * * 
"'It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within 
the letter of a statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit nor within the intention 
of its makers' (Holy Trinity ·Church v. United States, 
143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 512, 36 L. Ed. 226), and 
'a thing which is within the letter of the statute is 
not within the statute unless it be within the inten-
tion of the makers' (Riggs v. Palmer, 1115 N. Y. 506, 
509, 22 N. E. 188, 189, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. 
Rep. 819). There is a presumption existing against 
the construction of a statute which would render it 
ineffective, inefficient, or which would cause grave 
public injury, as well as where it would render. the 
statute unconstitutional. Bird v. United States, 187 
U. S. 124, 23 S. ,Ct. 42, 47 L. Ed. 100." 
In the case at bar the construction contended for by 
plaintiff and appellant, which would strictly limit the ap-
plication of 'Chapter 19 of Laws of 194"3- to tax titles arising 
upon sales made pursuant to and after the 1939 amend-
ment, would render the statute "ineffective, inefficient, 
and would cause grave public injury." Such a construction 
would not assist the county in getting property back on 
the tax rolls. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
There. is another point to be considered here. If the 
construction contended for by appellant with reference to 
Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, should be adopted by this 
court then it would compel a holding by this court that 
Chapter 8, Laws of 1947 is unconstitutional, whereas if the 
theory contended for by respondent should be adopted by 
the court, there would be no necessity for the court to de-
clare :Chapter 8 of Laws of 1947 unconstitutional. Chapter 
8 of Laws of Utah 1947 was enacted by the legislature 
merely to clarify and show what was actually intended by 
it in 1Chapter 19 of Laws of 1943. :Chapter 8 did not have 
a saving clause providing that an action could be main-
tained or defense set up within four years from the effec-
tive date of the act. If there is no saving clause such a 
statute cannot be applied immediately. There must be some 
reasonable lapse of time allowed during which the prior 
owner can bring his action or set up his defense. This sav-
ing clause was included in Chapter 19, Laws of 1943, and 
if this chapter is given effect with respect to all.defective 
tax titles so as to limit the period to four years from and 
after the effective date of the act, then there is no necessity 
for a saving clause with respect to ·Chapter 8, Laws of 1947, 
because Chapter 19, Laws of 1943 would take care of the 
four-year period and would be a bar to actions or defenses 
brought or set up by prior owners, and Chapter 8 as set 
forth in the 19·4-7 statutes then would need to be applied 
only to sales which may be made on or after the effective 
date of such act. Thus by construing the 1947 amendment 
as contained in Chapter 8 to be merely a legislative inter-
pretation of the intent of the legislature when it enacted 
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Chapter 19, we would have a construction which would 
save the constitutionality and make effective both statutes. 
In the Pondera case the Montana court went on to say : 
"So, here, the statute under consideration can 
be rendered effective and constitutional by declaring 
that the provision as to the division of interest and 
penalties therein provided for applies only to amounts 
collected on the payment of delinquent taxes levied 
for state and county purposes, and does not apply to 
payments made in connection with taxes levied for 
the support of other bodies politic. As stated in H·oly 
Trinity 'Church v. United States, above: 'This is not 
the substitution of the will of the judge for that of 
the legislator; for frequently words of general mean-
ing are used in a statute, words broad enough to in-
clude any act in question, and yet a consideration of 
the whole legislation, or of the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment, or of the absurd results 
which follow from giving such broad meaning to the 
words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the leg-
islator intended to include the particular act.' 
"But it is urged that, because section 2234 was 
amended in 1929~ to read as we now interpret the 
section, we must presume that a change in the law 
was made, and that, originally, it did not so provide, 
citing 36 Cyc. 116·5. Like most rules, the rule that 
a change in the law is presumed from the fact of 
amendment has its exceptions, among which is the 
rule that the presumption falls when its indulgence 
would violate a constitutional provision or the inten-
tion of the Legislature * * * an~ a change in 
a statute may be made merely to express more clearly 
the original intention of the Legislature (State ex 
rei. Rankin v. Wibaux County Bank, 85 Mont. 532, 
281 P. 341). Thus an amendment to a statute mak-
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ing it directly applicable to a particular case is not 
necessarily an admission on the part of the Legisla-
ture that it did not originally cover such a case. 
Rural Independent School District v. New Indepen-
dent School District, 120 Iowa 119, 9·4 N. W. 284. 
"Here a reasonable inference from the fact of 
amendment is that * * * the Legislature ex-
pressed more clearly its original intention * * * 
and, because of what is heretofore said, we now hold 
that such was the intention of the Legislature con-
cerning, and the effect of, section 22314 before amend-
ment." 
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, ·Third Edition, 
Volume 2, Section 4·503, page 319, states: 
"Inasmuch as the court cannot escape the con-
sequence that its determination will affect the mean-
ing of the statute, it would appear to be a more ap-
propriate exercise of the judicial function if the 
court would face the difficult task and at the risk 
of being wrong, determine as best it can what the 
legislature intended. If the court decides incorrectly, 
the legislature may at succeeding sessions correct the 
error. If it decides correctly, it will have saved the 
expense and burden of the legislative process and 
will have given judicial relief to those who were in 
·the beginning entitled to it." 
We think there would be no question but what if the 
construction as contended for by appellant were given 'to 
Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, it would necessitate further 
action on behalf of the legislature, and the matter would be 
so amended in the next legislature as to still shorten the 
period of limitations during which prior owners could at-
tack defective tax titles in order to enable counties within 
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the State of Utah to maintain and replace these properties 
on their tax rolls to receive the tax revenue they are en-
titled to therefrom. 
In finding a basis to construe the intent of the legisla-
ture we are not left solely to text statements and cases from 
other jurisdictions. This court has given us very definite 
rules by which we can arrive at a proper construction of 
such a statute as the one involved in Chapter 19, Laws of 
Utah 1943. In the case of Norville v. Tax Commission, 98 
Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 9'3!7, this court went to considerable 
length in setting forth the basis of proper construction of 
such tax statutes. We quote the following exerpts from that 
case: 
"Statutes duly enacted by the legislature are 
presumed to be constitutional and valid. ('Cases 
cited.) When there is ambiguity in the terms of a 
statute or when it is susceptible of two interpreta-
tions, one of which would render it unconstitutional 
and the other would bring it within constitutional 
sanctions, the court is bound to choose that interpre-
tation which would uphold the statute. * * * 
(Cases cited.) " 
While it was not involved nor directly stated in that case a 
similar rule has been announced many times that where 
a statute may be susceptible of two interpretations, one of 
which would give it effect and the other would show it ·to 
be an entirely useless and ineffective piece of paper, that 
construction which would give some meaning and effect 
to the statute would be adopted. In the Norville case the 
court goes on to state: 
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"The duty of this court in construing and inter-
preting legislative acts is to give effect to the intent 
of the legislature. (Cases cited.) 
"As stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construc-
tion, Sec. 241, at p. 320: 'In the exposition of a stat-
ute the intention of the law-maker will prevail over 
the literal sense of the terms; and its reason and 
intention will prevail over the strict letter. When 
the words are not explicit the intention is to be col-
lected from the context; from the occasion and neces-
sity of the law; from the mischief felt, and the reme-
dy in view; and the intention is to be taken or pre-
sumed according to what is consonant with reason 
and good discretion.' 
"In Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 
455, 54 S. Ct. 806, 809, 78 L. Ed. 13:61, the United 
States Supreme Court reaffirmed what it said in 
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 43 S. 1Ct. 65, 
67 L. Ed. 199: 'We may then look to the reason of 
the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history 
and give it effect in accordance with its design and 
purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal mean-
ing in order that the purpose may not fail.' 
"See also State v. Livingston Concrete Bldg. & 
Mfg. Co., 34 Mont. 57·0, 87 P. 980, 9 Ann. Cas. 204, 
and Territory ex rei. Sampson v. ·Clark, supra (2 
Okl. 82, 35 P. 883) , wherein the Court said : 'When 
the intention (of the legislature) can be gathered 
from the statute, words may be modified, altered, or 
supplied to give to the enactment the force and effect 
which the legislature intended.' (Italics ours.) 
"* * * 
"The general rule of construction of ambiguous 
words in a statute is stated in 3 A. L. R. 404: 'Where 
words have been omitted from a statute or an ordin-
ance by inadvertence or through a clercial error, 
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and the intent of the legislature is ascertainable from 
the context, the court will insert the words necessary 
to carry out that intent. 1Courts will not permit an 
act to be declared invalid for uncertainty, where 
reason demands the insertion of words therein.' 
"See annotations there given. In Chez ex rel. 
Weber College v. Utah State Building Commission, 
93 Utah 538, 7 4 P. 2d 687, 692, this court held that 
'words which are obviously necessary to complete 
the sense (of a statute) will be supplied to effect a 
meaning clearly shown by other part~ of the stat-
ute.' " 
A meaning clearly shown by other parts of the statute is 
adequately supplied and confirmed by the provisions of 
Chapters 18 and 20, Laws of 1943. 
It would not need any supplying of additional words to 
show that Section 80-10-66· was intended to be covered by 
the legislature because a comparison of the two sections 
shows that 80-10-68 ( 6) embodies the provisions covering 
real property sold and conveyed to the county or real prop-
erty struck off and sold to the county as they were originally 
contained in 80-10-66. Therefore, real property that is sold 
and conveyed by auditor's deed to the county as provided 
by Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of 1933, is real prop-
erty struck off and sold to the county and conveyed to the 
county by auditor's endorsement on the tax sale record as 
provided by Section 80-10-68 (6), Utah Code Annotated 
1943. 
By giving proper construction to the statute in ques-
tion and considering the remedy sought to be effected by 
the statute, there is no question but what it was directly 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
intended to cover a situation such as the one involved in this 
case at bar and could have no other purpose. 
ARG·UMiENTS NO. 3 AN·D NO. 6 
PLAIN:T'IFF'S ACTION IS AND .WAS BARRE,D B·Y 
THE PROVISIO·NS O·F SECTI~ON 104-2-5, UTAH :CQ!DE 
ANNOTAT'ED 1943, AS AMENDED BY ·CHAPTER 18, 
L.A WS OF UT'AH 1943. 
P'LAINIT'IFF'S. ACTION IS BARRED BY THE PRO-
V1ISIO·NS. 0'F SECTION 104-2-6, U'TAH C:ODE ANN;O-
TATED 19'43, AS AMENDED BY C'HAPTE·R 20, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1943. 
Sections 1 04-2-S and 104-2-6, Utah ·Code Annotated 
1943, refer specifically to actions involving adverse posses-
sion of realty. Originally Section 5 provided that no action 
should be brought for the possession of realty unless it ap-
peared that the plaintiff o;r predecessor was seized or pos-
sessed of the property within seven years. Section 6 as 
originally contained in the 1943 ·Code is a little broader and 
states that no cause of action or defense or counterclaim 
founded on the title or rents or profits out of the same shall 
be effectual unless the person urging the cause of action or 
defense, or predecessor, was seized or possessed of the prop-
erty within seven years. By Chapter 18 and Chapter 20, 
Laws of 19·43 the legislature in effect repeated these pro-
visions with respect to seisin and possession of the property 
and adverse possession, but in each instance added a provi-
sion which stated that where tax titles were involved and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
where the property ·involved was held by another under 
tax deed, then the plaintiff or the one urging the cause of 
action or defense must show that he or his predecessor in 
interest was seized or possessed of the property within four 
years. THESE TWO CHAPTERS SH·O·W VERY DiE FIN-
ITELY TH·E INT'ENT O·F THE LE'GISLATURE TO MAKE 
A SHORTER PERIOD OF LIMIT'ATION FO·R AD·VERS.E 
POSSESSION WHERE ONE GOES INTO P088ESSIO·N 
UNDER A TAX TITLE. 
Appellant in his Argument No. 3 states that these sec-
tions cannot apply because if one can show a legal record 
title as plaintiff does here, even though the property is pos-
sessed by another, that such possession or occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been 
under and in subordination to the legal title unless it shall 
appear that the property has been held and possessed ad-
versely for seven years. • 
This presumption is not a conclusive presumption but 
is merely a presumption that possession will follow the 
legal title unless there is evidence to the contrary, and if· 
there is evidence to the contrary, then such presumption 
will not and cannot be invoked. Section 104-2-5- says that 
one seeking to recover the property cannot maintain such 
an action "unless it appears" that he or his ancestor was 
seized or possessed of the property within seven years. 
Neither the plaintiff nor its predecessors, according to stip-
ulated facts in the record, was seized or possessed of this 
property at any time after March, 193.6, and the action in 
question was not filed until substantially more than eleven 
years later. 
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What is meant by the words "seized or possessed"? 
"Possessed" is defined by Webster as, "To occupy in per-
son; to have as occupant, to have and hold." This definition 
was adopted and used by the. Supreme Court of Texas in 
Evans v. Foster, 15 S. W. 170 .. 
In Fuller v. Fuller (Me.) 24 A. 946, the court said: 
"According to etymology the word possession 
means to sit upon, hence to occupy in person.'' 
In the case of Hoysradt v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 151 F. at 
page 330, the Federal Court said: 
"In the primary and most familiar sense of the 
word 'occupy' it is the equivalent to the word 'pos-
sess'." 
"Seisin" is defined by Webster as, "Possession or cor-
poral ppssession; the act of taking possession.'' 
At early common law a landlord or seller would take 
a tenant or purchaser onto the land and there hand him a 
branch or handful of soil, thereby giving him as near as 
could be possible the actual possession of the land. This was 
termed livery of seisin, and the tenant or purchaser would 
thereafter remain on the land and be considered as seized 
thereof. 
In the case of Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cannon, 46 
F. 224, the F'ederal Court said : 
"The term 'seised' is equivalent to the term 
'possessed.' 'Seisin' means 'possession'." 
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Bragg v. Wiseman, (W. Va.) 47 S. E. 90: 
"In the common law seisin signified possession." 
Webb v. Wheeler, (Neb.) 114 N. W. 636; Finlay v. 
Stevens, 36 A. 2d 767 : 
"Seisin means a claim of title accompanied with 
possession." 
Mercer County State Bank of Manhaven v. Hayes, (N. 
D.) 159- N. W. 74: 
"Seisin implies possession. It is possession with 
a legal right to the estate in the land." 
Woolfolk v. Buehner, (Ark.) 55 S. W. 168: 
"Seisin and possession are synonymous mean-
ing that possession which is held under claim of 
title." 
Ft. Dearborn Lodge I. 0. 0. F. v. Klein, (Ill.) 3 N. E. 
272: 
"Seisin means possession with the intentio:p of 
asserting a claim to a freehold estate in the prem-
ises." 
Altschiel v. O'Neill, (Ore.) 58 P. 9S; Hess v. Hess, 
(Ore.) 91 P. 2d 850: 
"Seisin may be defined to be a possession of 
land under a claim either express or implied by law 
of an estate amounting at least to a freehold." 
Ford v. Garner's Adm., 49 Ala. 601; Mellenthin v. 
Brantman, (Minn.) 1 N. W. ·2'd 141: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
''Under our law the word seisin has no accurate-
ly defined meaning; at common law it imported a 
feudal investiture of title by actual possession. We 
say it has the force of possession under some legal 
title or right to hold." 
The record clearly shows that neither the plaintiff 
nor any predecessor in interest held or ·occupied or had 
possession of any of this property at any time since 1936, 
eleven years prior to the commencement of this action. 
Plaintiff does not even seek to deny that. Plaintiff merely 
asserts that it and its predecessor were seized by virtue of 
holding the paper record title. 
In the case of Towson v. Denson, 86 S. W. 661, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas had a statute somewhat similar 
to the one involved here in issue before it and that court 
held that a mere constructive possession was not "seisin" 
within the meaning of that State's l{irby's Digest, Section 
5061, which provided that no action for the recovery of 
lands sold for taxes should be maintained against the pur-
chaser unless the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest was 
seized or possessed of the lands within two years next be-
fore the commencement of the action. 
·Clearly, in the case at bar, neither the plaintiff nor 
any ancestor, grantor or predecessor in interest was seized 
or. possessed of the property in question within seven years 
before the commencement of this action and the evidence 
before this court shows that fact affirmatively and the 
presumption of possession following the record title there-
. fore falls and Section 104-2-5 is a bar to plaintiff's action 
herein. 
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Thus under the provisions of Section 104-2-5, such 
section would have been a bar to plaintiff's action even 
prior to the amendment of 1943- as contained in 1Chapter 18, 
Laws of Utah 1943. Under the provisions of said ·Chapter 
18 the period is reduced to four years, and it cannot be dis-
puted that neither plaintiff nor its predecessors was seized 
or possessed of the property within four years prior to com-
_mencement of plaintiff's action herein. 
With respect to plaintiff's argument that one holding 
possession adversely is presumed to hold under and in sub-
ordination of the legal title, our only answer is that this 
court has held contrary to plaintiff's contention. 
The case of Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490, 
will be instructive and helpful at this point. 
"* * * The respondent Amanda Stearns 
* * * held the legal or paper title to the lots, 
and, so far as appears, never was in actual occupancy 
thereof. In 18~1 or 189-2 she ceased to pay taxes on 
the lots, and they were sold to Salt Lake county for 
the unpaid taxes for the years of 1892 and 1893. 
After the four-year redemption period had elapsed, 
and Almanda Stearns had failed and neglected to re-
deem the lots from the tax sale, a tax deed, which 
purported to convey them to Salt Lake county, was 
duly issued, and delivered to it, in August, 1898. The 
undisputed evidence shows that in the spring of 1899 
appellant took actual possession of all of the lots in 
controversy. * * * After appellant had gone 
into possession, as aforesaid, and before the county 
delivered a deed to him, he paid to it all of the taxes, 
including costs that had accrued, against the lots, 
and which had remained unpaid, commencing with 
the year 1891 or 1892 and up to and including the 
year 1898, the year when the tax deed was issued 
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to Salt Lake county, and, in consideration of the pay-
ment of the taxes and costs, Salt Lake county, in 
May, 1900, made and delivered a deed conveying the 
property to him. * * *" 
Appellant continued in possession after the county deeded 
to him and paid all taxes up to . the time of the trial. This 
court after reviewing the facts and circumstances stated: 
"In our judgment, the whole question hinges 
upon whether the appellant had acquired title to the 
lots in controversy by adverse possession." 
In the case at bar we admit that defendant cannot prove 
a good tax title, and ther~fore the question is whether the 
defendant can prevail upon the basis of adverse possession 
under the four-year statute as contained in ·chapter 19, 
Laws of Utah 1943. 
In the Stearns case it was admitted by the respondent 
that the appellant's possession was adverse-at' least from 
the time he obtained his deed from Salt Lake 'County-but 
it was contended that seven years had not elapsed after that 
time up to the filing of the original action. ·This court fur-
ther stated: 
"* * * The county had obtained a tax deed 
as early as August, 1898. The county's tax title, al-
though defective, was in no way related to or based 
upon the title of Almanda Stearns. Under our stat-
ute, as under most of the state statutes of the Union, 
the tax sale initiates a new title, and has no relation 
with the previous chain of title. 37 ·Cyc. 1473. When 
the period of redemption had expired and the tax 
deed had issued, the county thereafter held under a 
new title, and any possession that was taken by vir-
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tue of such new title was, prima facie at least, ad-
verse to the original title. * * * In view, there-
fore, that by the tax deed a new title was ereated, 
there can be no presumption that the possession of 
appellant was in subordination of Almanda Stearns' 
title. This presumption was fully met and destroyed 
by reason of the foregoing circumstances. * * *" 
(Italics ours.) 
The same would be true in the case at bar. The pre-
sumption that defendant held possession under and in sub-
ordination to plaintiff's legal title was fully met and de-
stroyed by reason of the circumstances set forth herein. 
In the Stearns case it was argued that: 
"* * * because .appellant did not obtain his 
deed from the county until May, 1900, therefore he 
did not have color of title until that time. * * *" 
Admittedly after that time he would have had color of title. 
This court further said: 
"* * * For the purpose of meeting the pre-
sumption that appellant took and remained in pos-
. session in subordination of the paper title, it is im-
material that the tax deed was defective, and did not 
in law convey an indefeasible title. Appellant's pos-
session was just as much adverse to Borg's title, al-
though the deed was defective, as it would have been 
if the deed had conveyed a perfect title; the only 
difference being that under a deed which is defective 
the claimant in possession must obtain the title, if 
he obtains it at all, by virtue of the statute, while 
if the deed is good, and conveys an indefeasible title, 
. the title is in him from the time the deed is delivered. 
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"* * * If possession can ever be hostile and 
adverse to the claimant of paper title, then it seems 
to us that, under the evidence in this case, appellant's 
possession was so, and that, unless the judgment or 
decree can be supported upon some other ground, 
it must fail." 
In that case judgment had been given by the trial court in 
favor of the holder of the record title, and this court re-
versed the trial court in favor of the tax title under adverse 
possession of the appellant. 
With respect to the lack of tax payments this court said: 
"* * * Almanda Stearns had then failed to 
pay any taxes on the property, and had apparently 
abandoned it for a period of 17 or 18 years, when she 
purported to convey it to Addison ·Cain. The respon-
dent Borg, who is the grantee of Cain, stands in no 
better plight than either 1Cain or Almanda Stearns 
would stand. * * *" 
In the case at bar the heirs of Oscar Hunter were 
scattered over the country. Plaintiff's predecessors had 
paid no attention to the property from the time when they 
conveyed their interest to Mindwell Chipman Hunter in 
1931, save for the deed which she later gave to Irene Hunter 
Chamber lain in 19a6, and all of them failed to pay any 
taxes on the property for a period now approaching nine-
teen years. The parties evidently knew the property had 
been sold for taxes because Mindwell C. Hunter gave only 
a bargain and sale deed, not a warranty deed, to Irene 
Hunter Chamberlain in 1936, and Irene H. Chamberlain 
McApline gave only a quitclaim deed to plaintiff in 1947. 
Therefore, the same thing could be said of plaintiff and its 
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predecessors as was said in the Stearns case-they failed 
to pay any taxes on the property and apparently abandoned 
it for a period of seventeen or eighteen years and then 
purported to convey it to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, 
who is a grantee· of Irene Hunter Chamberlain is in no 
better plight than either Mrs. Chamberlain or Mindwell 
Chipman Hunter. 
Clearly, under the authority of this Stearns case, t.he 
possession of the defendant from a time it secured its deed 
from Salt Lake c·ounty would not be "under and in subordi-
nation to the legal title" at any time after the county's deed 
to the defendant, and it affirmatively appears that the_ prop-
. · · · · erty had not been seized or possessed by the plaintiff or any 
of its predecessors at any time since 19'36. 
Respondent respectfully submits that Section 104-2-5, 
as amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah 1943, is an effec-
tive bar to plaintiff in this action. The same provisions 
were included in the amendment by which our legislature 
amended Section 104-2-6, and Chapter 20, L·aws ·of Utah 
1943, would likewise be applicable to bar plaintiff's action 
and also confirms the argument given herein under what 
is designated as appellant's point No. 4, showing the intent 
of the legislature in enacting the statutes as they did in 
1943. 
ARGUMENT N·O. 7 
·CHAPT'ER 19, LAWS OF UTAH 1943,. AS A·ME·ND-
ED BY 1CH'AP'T;ER 8, LAWS O'F UT'A'H 1947, IS NOT 
UN·CONSTITUTION1AL. 
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Respondent admits as good law that Chapter 8, Laws 
of Utah 1947, should be considered unconstitutional if taken 
alone and by itself. Had there been no prior enactment as 
contained in 'Chapter 19, Laws of 1943, then it would have 
been imperative to have a saving clause in Chapter 8, Laws 
of 1947, by which some reasonable time would have been 
given to enable prior property owners to make some claim 
with respect to their property. 
Defendant and respondent is not relying upon Chapter 
8, Laws of 1947, to sustain its title by limitation herein. 
Defendant is relying upon Chapter 19, Laws of 1943. How-
ever, ;Chapter 8, Laws of 1947, does assist the court in in-
terpreting and construing what was meant by the legisla-
ture when it enacted Chapter 19, Laws of 1943. The enact-
ment of such Chapter 19, together with the two adjoining 
chapters, 18 and 20, shows very clearly the intent of the 
legislature. Chapter 19 can be applied to all tax titles which 
by reason of some defect did not pass to the county or to 
subsequent purchasers what was intended. Where such 
tax titles are .defective, as is true in the case at bar, ·Chapter 
19, Laws of 1943, sets a limitation and prior owners must 
assert their rights within four years. Chapter 8, Laws of 
1947, merely clarified what was intended and very defin-
itely shows that the legislature intended to cover all defec-
tive tax titles in order to get tax properties back .on the 
rolls, and there was no intent to limit such four-year pro-
vision only to .tax titles that may accrue under the limited 
construction as contended for by plaintiff. By giving this 
interpretation to the statutes and by concluding that the 
1947 amendment contained in Chapter 8 was merely a clar-
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ification by the legislature, there is no necessity of declar-
ing said 'Chapter 8 unconstitutional, and if any construction 
can be taken by this court which will so uphold such a stat-
ute as constitutional, then such interpretation and construc-
tion should be given .. 
ARGUMENT NO. 8 
We would like to call the court's attention to the fact 
that in the findings and judgment as signed by the court 
defendant's title was not quieted. Defendant was not given 
affirmative relief, and by barring the plaintiff from fur-
ther prosecuting such an action, the court did not give the 
defendant affirmative relief further than to say that the 
action would be res judicata and that anyone claiming by 
the plaintiff or through the plaintiff could not bring such 
an action against the defendant upon the same facts. 
·C·QN:CLUSION 
By way of conclusion we wish to reiterate that the 
question involved herein is not one as to whether the tax 
sale or auditor's deed to the county and the resultant deed 
to the defendant were valid or invalid. ·True, that matter 
comes in incidentally because if the tax sale and the auditor's 
tax deed and all tax proceedings had been valid, we would 
not be concerned in any 'Yay with the 1943 statute con-
tained in ·Chapter 19. But the fact that the tax sale and 
the auditor's deed were not valid and that there was thus 
a defect in the title which the county conveyed to the de-:-
fendant gives the reason and the only reason for the ap-
plication of such a limitation statute. Such defect and 
invalid tax title gives the reason and the only reason for · 
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the enactment of such a statute as was contai:r;ted in Chapter 
19, and gives the reason and the only reason for the amend-
ment of the two statutes as contained in Chapter 18 and 
Chapter 20, Laws of 1943. If the tax title were valid and 
if the auditor's deed defendant is relying on were also valid, 
we would not attempt to rely either on the four-year statute 
of limitation or any other statute of limitation. The tax 
sale and the auditor's tax deed followed by the deed from 
the county to the defendant merely gave rise to conditions 
under which the defendant secured possession. The defen-
dant secured that possession with the deed from the county 
on or shortly prior to November 7, 1941, and that deed gave 
the defendant color of title sufficient to form the basis of 
an adverse possession against plaintiff or any of its pred-
ecessors. The fact that the tax proceedings were void does 
not say that the county nor the defendant under the county 
holds possession in subordination to the legal title. The 
cases of this court have decided to the contrary, and such 
tax proceedings do give inception to a new title which forms 
a sufficient basis to show that defendant's possession was 
adverse and not in subordination to the plaintiff's right. 
• 
The statute contained in Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 
1943, is not a curative statute. It does not and did not in-
tend to say that what the county had done on its tax titles 
would be approved and that such tax titles would be con-
sidered as valid and proper, but the statute says that even 
if such tax titles are invalid and improper, nevertheless 
where adverse possession has its inception in the county 
tax sale procedure the prior owner will be barred if he does 
not assert his right in four years. The statute is one of 
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limitation to enable the county to recover its tax monies and 
to get such properties back on the tax rolls. 
A consideration of the background and reason for the 
enactment of the statute leaves no other construction for 
this court except to conclude that by the 1943 statute the 
legislature intended to give a basis whereby all of the de-
fective tax titles that had accrued over the period of the 
depression during the 1930's and prior could be perfected 
by a shorter period of limitation, and there was no intent 
whatsoever to limit it to tax procedures or tax sales which 
had occurred after the amendment of 1939-. The intent of. 
the legislature was to cover all tax titles and that intent 
was very clearly and definitely shown by the amendment 
which the legislature made in the 1947 law after controver-
sies had arisen concerning what the 1943 law actually cov-
ered. The amendment merely clarified the 194:3 act. 
Respondent submits that the trial court did not err in 
any respect and the judgment of the trial court upholding 
both the 1943 statute and the 1947 amendment with respect 
thereto should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. U. MINER, 
Of Counsel. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
August 1, 1949. 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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